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T he History of aesthetic modernism has often been written as the triumph of form over content,the apotheosis of self-referentiality over the 
representation or expression of anything external to the artwork.1 The critical 
discourse accompanying modernism has likewise been preoccupied with formal 
issues, whether approvingly, as in the case of writers like Roger Fry, Clive Bell 
and the Russian Formalists, or not, as in that of most Marxist critics. For the 
latter, the very term »formalist« became, as we know all too well, a 
convenient term of abuse, with opponents like Georg Lukâcs and Bertolt 
Brecht ingeniously concocting ways to pin the label on each other.2 No less 
heated has been the discussion, extending at least as far back as Simmel, of the 
putative links between the formal abstraction of modern life as a whole and its 
aesthetic counterpart. Modernity, in short, has sometimes seemed coterminous 
with the very differentiation of form from content, indeed even the
fetishization of self-sufficient form as the privileged locus of meaning and 
value.
In what follows, I want less to overturn this conventional wisdom than 
problematize it, by pursuing the trail of what can be called a subordinate 
tendency in aesthetic modernism, which challenged the apotheosis and
purification of form. That is, I want to explore what might be called a 
powerfully anti-formalist impulse in modern art, which can be most
conveniently identified with Georges Bataille’s spirited defense of informe.3 In 
so doing, I also hope to provide some insights into the complicated relations 
between modernism, the contest over the hegemony of form, and what I have 
elsewhere called the crisis of ocularcentrism, the denigration of vision
especially virulent in 20th-century French thought.4
1. See, for example, Peter Bürger, Theory o f the A  vant-Garde, trans. Michael Shaw 
(Minneapolis, 1984), p. 19; or Suzi Grablik, Progress in A rt (New York, 1976), p. 85.
2 . See the essays collected in A esthetics and Politics; Debates Between Bloch, Lukâcs, Brecht, 
Benjamin, Adorno, ed. New Left Review, Afterword Fredric Jameson (London, 1977).
3 . Bataille, »Formless,« in Visions o f Excess; Selected Writings, 1927-1939, ed. Allan Stoekl, 
trans. Allan Stoekl et al. (Minneapolis, 1985). The article first appeared as an entry in the 
dictionnaire critique in Documents, 7 (December, 1929).
4 . Martin Jay, »In the Empire of the Gaze: Foucault and the Denigration of Vison in 
20th-century French Thought,« in Foucault: A  Critical Reader, ed. David Couzens Hoy 
(London, 1986: »The Rise of Hermeneutics and the Crisis of Ocularcentrism,« The Rhetoric 
o f Interpretation and the Interpretation o f Rhetoric, ed. Paul Hernadi (Durham, N.C., 1989).
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Before entering the obscure and labyrinthine territory of the informe, let me 
pause a moment with the concept, or rather concepts, of form to which it was 
deliberately counterposed. Although this is not the place to hazard a full-scale 
investigation of the multiple meanings adhering to that term, it will be useful 
to recall five different senses that have had a powerful impact in the history of 
aesthetics.5 First, form has been identified with the composite arrangement or 
order of distinct parts or elements, for example the disposition of shapes in a 
painting or notes in a melody. Good form has in this sense generally meant 
proportion, harmony and measure among the component parts. Second, form 
has meant what is given directly to the senses as opposed to the content 
conveyed by it, how, for instance, a poem sounds rather than what it 
substantively means. Formal value in this sense has meant sensual pleasure as 
opposed to a paraphrasable core of significance. Third, form has signified the 
contour or shape of an object, as opposed to its weight, texture or color. In this 
sense, clarity and grace are normally accorded highest honors. Fourth, form 
has been synonymous with what Plato called Ideas and Aristotle entelechies, 
that is, with the most substantial essence of a thing rather than its mere 
appearance. Here formal value has carried with it a metaphysical charge, 
suggesting the revelation of a higher truth than is normally evident in everyday 
perception. Fifth and finally, form has meant the constitutive capacity of the 
mind to impose structure on the world of sense experience. Kant’s first 
Critique is the locus classicus of this notion of form, with its attribution of a 
priori cognitive categories to the human intellect. Although Kant himself did 
not attribute comparable transcendental categories to aesthetic judgement, 
later critics like Konrad Fiedler, Alois Riegl and Heinrich Wöllflin did seek 
universal formal regularities governing aesthetic as well as epistemological 
experience.
The modernist apotheosis of form has at one time or another drawn on all of 
these meanings. Thus, for example, the denigration of ornament in the 
architecture of an Adolf Loos, Le Corbusier or the Bauhaus meant the holistic 
elevation of structural proportion and measure over the isolated fetish of 
component parts. Similarly, the stress on the musical sonority of poetry, 
typically expressed in Verlaine’s famous injunction to wring the neck of 
eloquence, indicated the apotheosis of form as sensual immediacy over 
mediated content. The autonomization of line and figure in the abstract 
paintings of a Mondrian or Malevitch likewise indicated the triumph of 
contour over texture or color, as well, of course, as over mimetic, narrative or 
anecdotal reference. In the case of a painter like Kandinsky, the liberation of 
abstract form was defended in the name of a religious essentialism that evoked
5 . Here I am drawing on the excellent essay by W. Tatarkiewicz on »Form in the History of 
Aesthetics« in Dictionary o f the H istory o f Ideas, vol. II, ed. Philip P. Weiner (New York, 
1973).
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Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysical notion of substantial form. And finally, 
there has been no shortage of modernist artists who characterize their work as 
the willful imposition of form on the chaos outside them, and perhaps inside as 
well.
If, however, much of modernism can be interpreted as the hypertrophy of 
form in many or all of its senses, there has been from the beginning a counter- 
-impulse within modern art which has resisted it, a refusal to countenance the 
differentiation and purification characteristic of modernist aesthetics in 
general. It is important to note, however, that this resistance has not taken 
place in the name of one of form’s typical antonyms, such as content, subject 
matter or element. It has not provided the materialist antidote to self- 
-referentiality that a Marxist like Lukâcs so fervently craved. Rather, it has 
preferred to define itself, if it deigned to submit itself to definition at all, in 
negative terms, as deformation or, more radically still, as formlessness. Instead 
or privileging ideal formal beauty, it has sought to valorize baseness and 
ignobility. In the place of purity and clarity, it has favored impurity and 
obscurity.
Here, of course, there have been precedents, as the history of the grotesque as 
an aesthetic concept demonstrates.6 But what gives the modernist turn against 
form its special power is its linkage with a widespread critique of visual 
primacy, of the ocularcentric bias of the Western tradition in its most Hellenic 
moods. The link between form and vision has, of course, often been 
emphasized, ever since it was recognized that the Latin word forma translated 
both the visually derived Greek words morphe and eidos. Thus, for example, 
Jacques Derrida has observed in his critique of form and meaning in Husserl 
that »the metaphysical domination of the concept of form is bound to occasion 
some submission to sight. This submission always would be a submission of 
sense to sight, of sense to the sense-of-vision, since sense in general is the very 
concept of every phenomenological field.«7 Even linguistic notions of form 
carry with them a certain privileging of vision. According to the American 
deconstructionist David Carroll, the structuralism of Jean Ricardou and the 
Russian Formalists, »stresses the visibility of linguistic operations in the 
determination of the form of the novel. Form is constituted by the visible 
operations of language at work in the novel -  the frame of all frames.«8
The link between form and the primacy of vision is most obvious when the 
term signifies clarity of outline or luminous appearance, but it also lurks 
behind certain of the other meanings mentioned above. Thus, for example, the
6. For a subtle account of its implications, see Geoffrey Galt Harpham, On the Grotesque: 
Strategies o f Contradiction in A rt and Literature (Princeton, 1982).
7 . Jacques Derrida, »Form and Meaning: A Note on the Phenomenology of Language,« Margins 
o f Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago, 1972), p. 158.
8 . David Carroll, The Subject in Question: The Languages o f Theory and the Strategies o f 
Fiction  (Chicago, 1982), p. 191.
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identification of form with the proportion among discrete elements often 
draws on the visual experience of symmetrical commensurability. So too, the 
belief that form signifies essential truths draws on the Platonic contention that 
Ideas exist in the »eye of the mind.« Although it is of course true that form 
can be applied to aural, temporal phenomena, such as sonatas and symphonies, 
the capacity of the eye to register from a distance a static and simultaneous 
field of ordered regularity means that it is the primary source of our 
experience of form.9
If this is the case, it might be expected that an aesthetic modernism that 
privileged formalism would also be favorably inclined towards the hegemony 
of the eye. And as the influential school of criticism identified with the 
American art critic Clement Greenberg demonstrates, this expectation was not 
disappointed. For Greenberg spoke glowingly of the »purity« of the optical as 
the defining characteristic of the modernist visual arts, even sculpture.10 In 
literary terms, the same impulse may be discerned in Joseph Frank’s celebrated 
defense of the idea of spatial form in modern literature, which sought to undo 
Lessing’s distinction between the atemporal and temporal arts.11 And it should 
also be remembered that one of the cherished hopes of Russian Formalist 
criticism was precisely, as Jameson has noted, »the renewal of perception, the 
seeing of the world suddenly in a new light, in a new and unforesseen way.«12
However valid these characterizations of the dominant tendencies may be, and 
they were never entirely uncontroversial, uncontroversial, they fail to do 
justice to the subaltern tradition of formlessness that also must be accorded its 
place in the story of modernism. One avenue of entry into this alternative 
impulse can be found in the role of so-called primitive art in the early 
development of modernist aesthetics. In most accounts, it is recognition of the 
abstractly formal properties of that art which is given pride of place.13 Indeed, 
it was precisely the discovery in primitive artifacts of a universal 
»will-to-form« in Riegl’s sense by critics like Wilhelm Worringer, Roger Fry 
and Leo Frobenius that allowed their elevation into the realm of the 
aesthetically valuable.
The accompanying cost of this gesture, however, was the decontextualization 
of these works, which robbed them of any ethnographical value as objects of 
cultural practice. Generally forgotten as well as their ideological appropriation
9. On the relation between vision and form, see Hans Jonas, »The Nobility o f Sight,« The 
Phenomenon o f Life: Towards a Philosophical Biology (Chicago, 1982).
10. Clement Greenberg, A rt and Culture: Critical Essays (Boston, 1965), p. 171.
11. See, for example, Frank, »Spatial Form in Modern Literature,« in The Avant-G arde 
Tradition in Literature, ed. Richard Kostelanetz (Buffalo, N.Y., 1982).
12. Fredric Jameson, The Prison-House o f Language: A  C ritical A ccount o f Structuralism and 
Russian Formalism  (Princeton, 1972), p. 52.
13. See, for example, Robert Goldwater, Primitivism in M odem  A r t (Cambridge, Mass. 1986).
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in the later context of Western imperialism.14 Instead, their purely formal 
qualities were differentiated out from the entanglements of both their contexts 
of origin and reception, and then elevated into instances of a putatively 
universal aesthetic. As such, they could then provide inspiration for a 
modernist formalism, which was equally indifferent to its contextual 
impurities.
Although only recently have critics made us all so aware of the ambiguous role 
of primitivism in the origins of modern art, their critique was already 
anticipated in the counter-current that we have called modernist formlessness. 
In particular, it was implicit in the very different appropriation of the exotic 
by the French Surrealists, who never forgot the ethnographic dimension of the 
objects that could also be valued for their aesthetic significance.15 The circle 
around the journal Documents retained the emphasis on the sacred, ritual and 
mythic function of the artifacts, which they had imbibed from their readings in 
Durkheim and Mauss and their contact with fieldworkers like Alfred Métraux.
Foremost among them was Georges Bataille, who combined his interest in the 
sacred aspects of primitive culture with an appreciation of Dionysian frenzy 
and violent sexuality, derived from Nietzsche and Sade, into a full-blown 
defense of the virtues of transgression, hererogeneity, excess and waste. 
Among the most explicit values to be transgressed, according to Bataille, was 
the fetish of form in virtually all of its guises. In his 1929 entry on Informe in 
the Documents »dictionnaire critique,« he claimed that dictionaries really 
begin when they stop giving meaning to words and merely suggest their 
openended tasks instead. »Thus, « he continued, »formless is not only an 
adjective having a given meaning, but a term that serves to bring things down 
in the world, generally requiring that each thing have its form. What it 
designates has no rights in any sense and gets squashed everywhere, like a 
spider or an earthworm.«16 Whereas conventional philosophers always try to 
place the world into categorical straightjackets, assigning everything a proper 
form, what they tended to forget is the conflict between constative meaning 
and performative function. »Affirming that the universe resembles nothing 
and is only formless,« Bataille concluded, »amounts to saying that the universe 
is something like a spider or spit.«17 The »saying« of something so outrageous 
is not a truth claim in its own right, but rather an assault on all claims to 
reduce the world to formal truths.
14. For recent discussions of this issue, see Hal Foster, »The ’Primitive’ Unconscious of Modern 
Art,« October, 34 (Fall, 1985), pp. 45-70; and James Clifford, The Predicament o f Culture: 
Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature and A rt (Cambridge, Mass., 1988).
15. See Clifford, The Predicament o f Culture, chapter IV. It should also be noted that the 
Surrealists were keenly aware of the context of reception of primitive art, as they were 
among the most vociferous critics of French imperialism in the 1920’s.
16. Bataille, »Formless,« p. 31.
17. Ibid
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For Bataille, the problematic hegemony of conceptual and aesthetic form was 
explicitly linked to the ocularcentric bias of Western metaphysics.18 
Distinguishing between two traditions of solar illumination, he identified the 
first with the elevating Platonic sun of reason and order, which cast light on 
essential truths, and the second with the dazzling and blinding sun which 
destroyed vision when looked at too directly. The myth of Icarus, he 
contended, expressed this duality with uncommon power: »it clearly splits the 
sun in two -  the one that was shining at this moment of Icarus’s elevation, and 
the one that melted the wax, causing failure and a screaming fall when Icarus 
was too close.«19 Whereas traditional painting reflected the Platonic search for 
ideal form, modern painting, most explicitly that of Picasso and Van Gogh, 
had a very different goal: »academic painting more or less corresponded to an 
elevation -  without excess -  of the spirit. In contemporary painting, however, 
the search for that which most ruptures elevation, and for a blinding brilliance, 
has a share in the elaboration of decomposition of forms.«20
Bataille’s plea for the decomposition of form was expressed as well in his 
valorization of materialism, albeit one very different from that posited by 
traditional metaphysical or by Marxist dialectics.21 Rather than a materialism 
of the object, his was a materialism of the abject. As Rosalind Krauss has 
noted, '»Informe denotes what alteration produces, the reduction of meaning or 
value, not by contradiction -  which would be dialectical -  but by putrefaction: 
the puncturing of the limits around the term, the reduction to sameness of the 
cadaver -  which is transgressive.«22 Refusing to turn matter into a positive 
surrogate for spirit or mind, he linked it instead to the principle of 
degradation, which he saw operative in the Gnostic valorization of primal 
darkness.23 As a result, it was impossible to mediate between matter and form, 
as, say Schiller had hoped with his »play drive,« to produce a higher synthesis. 
The materialism of informe resisted any such elevating impulse.
The baseness of matter as opposed to the nobility of form was tied as well by 
Bataille to the recovery of the body, which had been suppressed by the
18. Although this is not the place to pursue the relation between visuality and conceptuality, it 
should be mentioned that not all theorists have found them synonymous. Theodor Adorno, 
for example, places visuality on the side of sensuality and juxtaposes it to the conceptual 
dimension o f art. See his discussion in A esthetic Theory, ed. Gretel Adorno and Rolf 
Tiedemann, trans. C. Lenhardt (London, 1984), p. 139f. He notes that the term »visuality« 
was used in epistemology to mean a content that was then formed.
19. Bataille, »Rotten Sun,« p. 58.
20 . Ibid For Bataille’s appreciation of Van Gogh in these terms, see his »Sacrificial Mutilation 
and the Severed Ear of Vincent Van Gogh,« in Visions o f Excess.
21. According to Rosalind Krauss, inform e meant the undoing of the Aristotelian distinction 
between form and matter, not the privileging of one over the other. See her The Originality 
o f the Avant-G arde and Other M odernist M yths (Cambridge, Mass, 1985), p. 53. This 
undoing, however, was more in the nature of a deconstruction than dialectical sublation.
22. Ibid., p. 64.
23. Bataille, »Base Materialism and Gnosticism,« Visions o f Excess, p. 47.
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exaltation of the cold, spiritual eye. It was, however, a grotesque, mutilated, 
headless body, a body whose boundaries were violated and porous, that he 
most valued. For Bataille, the waste products of the body, normally hidden and 
devalued as dirty or obscene, were closest to the experience of sacred excess 
and ecstatic expenditure realized in primitive religion. Here no measured 
proportion among elements, no sensual pleasure unsullied by violent pain, no 
sharply defined outlines, no revelation of essential ideas shone forth. Instead, 
formal beauty was consumed in the flames of a symbolic conflagration like 
that of the potlatch ceremonies of American Indians, whose conspicuous 
consumption of wealth he so admired.24
So too, form in the Kantian sense as the imposition of structure by a 
constitutive subject on the chaos of the world was utterly absent in Bataille’s 
theory. His idiosyncreatic concept of sovereignity meant the loss of willed 
control by a homogeneous agent and submission instead to the heterogeneous 
forces that exploded its integrity.25 The »acephalic« (headless) community he 
sought was based on the ecstatic sacrifice of subjectivity, individual and 
collective, not an act of conscious choice.26 It was also the opposite of merely 
formal democracy, which produced only a sterile and lifeless simulacrum of 
political freedom.
Bataille’s own writing can also be read as instantiating a principled resistance 
to the subjective imposition of form. Thus, Denis Hollier has claimed that 
»perhaps Bataille’s work gets its greatest strength in this refusal of the 
temptation of form. This refusal is the interdiction making it impossible in 
advance for his works ever to be ’complete,’ impossible for his book to be only 
books and impossible for his death to shut his words up. The transgression is 
transgression of form ... the temptation of discourse to arrest itself, to fix on 
itself, to finish itself off by producing and appropriating its own end. Bataille’s 
writing is antidiscoursive (endlessly deforms and disguises itself, endlessly rids 
itself of form). «27
It would be easy to offer other examples of Bataille’s critique of form and link 
them with his no less severe attack on the ocularcentric bias of Western 
culture. What is of more importance, however, is to establish the existence of
2 4 . Bataille, The A ccursed Share, vol. I, Comsumption, trans. Robert Hurley (New York, 1988), 
p. 63f.
25 . For a helpful account of the verieties of sovereignty, erotic, poetic and political, in Bataille, 
see Michele H. Richman, Reading Georges Bataille: Beyond the G ift (Baltimore, 1982), 
chapter III.
2 6 . Acéphale was the name of the group Bataille helped form at the Collège de Sociologie in the 
late 1930’s, which published a review with the same name. It referred to the headless body he 
found so attractive. For a sympathetic analysis of Bataille’s notion of Community, see 
Maurice Blanchot, The Unavowable Community, trans. Pierre Joris (Barrytown, N.Y., 1988).
2 7 . Denis Hollier, A gainst Architecture: the Writings o f Georges Bataille, trans. Betsy Wing 
(Cambridge, Mass, 1989), p. 24.
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a similar inclination among other significant modernist figures. Armed with an 
appreciation of Bataille’s defense of informe, several recent critics have 
provided us with the means to do so. For example, in her 1988 study of 
Rimbaud and the Paris Commune, Kristin Ross has examined the nature of 
class in his poetry and linked it to his celebrated call for the derangement of 
the senses with its explicit spurning of the Parnassian poets’ dependence on the 
mimetic eye. In Rimbaud, as she reads him, »grotesque, hyperbolic, 
extraordinary, superhuman perception is advocated in opposition to what 
capitalist development is at that moment defining (in the sense of setting the 
limits) as human, as ordinary perception.«28 The space that is prefigured in his 
poetry is not geometrically ordered or transparently lucid, a space peopled by 
formal groupings like parties or bureaucracies. It is instead a more tactile than 
visual space, an irregular field through which flows of energy and force pass 
without coalescing into visibly recognizable structures.29 The word Ross 
chooses to describe Rimbaud’s notion of class is »swarm,« which she compares 
positively to more traditional notions of a disciplined proletariat expressing its 
allegedly mature class consciousness by following the leadership of a vanguard 
party. »If ’mature’ class consciousness partakes of the serial groupings like the 
party or state,« she writes, »then the movement of Rimbaud’s swarm is much 
more that of the informe ( ’it has no form he give it no form’): the 
spontaneous, fermenting element of the group.«30 For all his celebrated 
elevation of the poet into the role of voyant, Rimbaud’s own work insisted on 
the importance of the erotic body as opposed to the spiritual eye, and resisted 
the differentiation of poetic form from everyday life. Just as he refused to be 
socialized through bourgeois formation, Rimbaud rejected the alternative 
art-for-art sake’s socialization into aesthetic form. His notorious decision to 
give up poetry entirely in favor of living dangerously was thus already 
anticipated in the poetry itself, which Ross interprets as the antithesis of the 
life-denying aestheticism expressed in Mallarmé’s fetish of the pure word.
No less exemplary of the modernist turn against formal purity was the 
remarkable experiments in photography carried out by the Surrealists in the 
interwar era, which have recently been interpreted in Bataille’s terms by 
Rosalind Krauss. Examining photographers like Jacques-André Boiffard, 
Brassai and Man Ray, she detected the trace of his, rather than André Breton’s 
ideas on their work. »The surrealist photographers were masters of the 
informe,« she writes, »which could be produced, as Man Ray had seen, by a 
simple rotation and consequent disorientation of the body.«31 Even surrealist
28. Kristin Ross, The Emergence o f Social Space: R im baud and the Paris Commune 
(Minneapolis, 1988), p. 102.
29. The obvious influence of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari on Ross’s celebration of force 
over form is explicitly acknowledged (p. 67).
30. Ibid, p. 123.
31. Rosalind Krauss, »Corpus Delicti,« October, 33 (Summer, 1985), p. 34.
Modernism and the retreat from form 69
painters like Masson and Dali, she argued, were in his debt: »It is to Bataille, 
not to Breton, that Dali owed the word informe with the particular, 
anamorphic spin.«32
According to Krauss, the dominant modernist defense of photography’s 
aesthetic credentials in strictly formalist terms, exemplified by champions of 
what is called »Straight Photography« like Edward Weston and John 
Szarkowski, was challenged by the surrealist introduction of textual and 
temporal interruptions into the pure image. »The nature of the authority that 
Weston and Straight Photography claim,« she writes, »is grounded in the 
sharply focused image, its resolution a figure of the unity of what the spectator 
sees, a wholeness which in turn founds the spectator himself as a unified 
subject. That subject, armed with a vision that plunges deep into reality and, 
through the agency of the photograph, given the illusion of mastery over it, 
seems to find unbearable a photography that effaces categories and in their 
place erects the fetish, the informe, the uncanny.«33
Still another instance of the alternative modernist tradition of debunking pure, 
visible form can be discerned in its receptivity to the aesthetics of the sublime. 
Although the sublime is often more closely identified with Romanticism or 
Post-modernism than with High Modernism, no less a celebrant of its 
importance than Jean-François Lyotard has claimed that »it is in the aesthetic 
of the sublime that modern art (including literature) finds its impetus and the 
logic of avant-gardes finds its axioms.«34 Painters from Malevitch to Barnett 
Newman, he claims, instantiate what Burke, Kant and other theorists of the 
sublime meant when they stressed its striving to present the unpresentable, its 
fidelity to the Hebraic injunction against graven images.35 »To make visible 
that there is something which can be conceived and which can neither be seen 
nor made visible:« Lyotard writes, »this is what is at stake in modern painting. 
But how to make visible that there is something which cannot be seen? Kant 
himself shows the way when he names ’formlessness, the absence of form,’ as a 
possible index to the unpresentable.«36 Although modernism, as opposed to 
the postmodernism he prefers, is still nostalgic for the solace of presentable 
from, it nonetheless exemplifies for Lyotard the ways in which art can disrupt 
the clarity and purity of formal beauty. In so doing, it reveals the workings of 
inchoate, libidinal desire, which explodes through the deceptively calm surface 
of both figurai and discursive representation.
32. Ibid, p. 37.
33 . Ibid, p. 72.
34 . Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A  Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff 
Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis, 1984), p. 77.
35 . For Lyotard on Newman and the sublime, see his »Newman: The Instant,« in The Lyotard 
Reader, ed. Andrew Benjamin (Oxford, 1989).
36 . Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, p. 78.
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One final instance of the modernist retreat from form can be found in music, 
where Schoenberg’s bold experiments in atonality and Sprechstimme were not 
the only challenge to traditional values. Perhaps even more extreme examples 
of what might be called musical inform e can be discerned in Futurist 
composers like Luigi Russolo, one of the founders of bruitismo.37 Here noise, 
often that of the jarring world of modern technology, was explicitly privileged 
over tone. Acoustical phenomena without any discernable pitch replaced those 
which could be translated into visible notation on a traditional scale. Although 
Futurist composition was relatively modest in achievement, the increasing 
incorporation of noise into modern music is evident in works like Igor 
Stravinsky’s L ’Histoire du Soldat (1918) and Edgard Varèse’s Ionisation 
(1931). Here timbre and color usurped the role normally given to pitch, as 
they also did in the so.called Klangfarben of Schoenberg and Berg. The new 
importance of color, however metaphorical that term may be in the lexicon of 
music, demonstrates a certain congruence with the other phenomena we have 
been discussing, for it has normally been counterposed to visual form.
Other examples of the retrospective critical appreciation of inform e in 
modernist art might be given as the conventional wisdom identified with Bell, 
Fry and Greenberg has come under increasing attack.38 But it is now time to 
explore more closely the implications of this new appreciation. What are the 
stakes involved when we go from identifying modernism with the abstraction 
of form in all of its guises from content, matter, etc. to identifying instead it 
with contested field in which the opposite impulse is also at play? What has 
been gained by acknowledging the importance of formlessness as at least a 
significant counter current within modernist art?
First, what has to be made clear is that inform e does not mean the simple 
negation of form, its wholesale replacement by chaos or the void. As Bataille 
contends, informe is not a positive definition, but a working term that 
functions by disruption and disorder. That is, it needs the prior existence of 
form, which it can then transgress, to be meaningful. Just as the grotesque 
operates by the disharmonious juxtaposition or integration of apparent formal 
opposites,39 just as the sublime keeps the tension between presentation and 
unpresentability, so too the informe needs its opposite to work its magic. If not
37. For a brief account, see H.H. Stuckenschmidt, Twentieth-Century Music, trans. Richard 
Deveson (New York, 1970), chapter 3.
38. See, for instance, Victor Bürgin, The E nd o f A r t Theory: Criticism and Postm odem ity 
(London, 1986); or the essays in A rt A fte r  Modernism: Rethinking Representation, ed. Brian 
Wallis (New York, 1984). In Mary Kelly’s contribution to the latter, »Reviewing Modernist 
Criticism,« she discusses the importance of performance art in terms that recall Bataille: 
»The art o f the ’real body’ does not pertain to the truth of visible form, but refers back to its 
essential content: the irreducible, irrefutable experience of pain.* (p. 96).
39. According to Harpman, »most grotesques are marked by such an affinity/antagonism, by the 
co-presence of the normative, fully formed ’high’ or ideal, and the abnormal, unformed, 
degenerate, ’low’ or material.« On the Grotesque: p. 9.
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for the powerful formalist impulse that so many critics have rightfully seen in 
modernism, the inform e would not be so insistently summoned up to 
undermine it.
There are several possible ways to conceptualize and explain the tension 
between form and formlessness that we have been tracing. One is to assimilate 
it to a more timeless struggle between structure and energy, stasis and 
movement, the immutable and the ephemeral. Here we reenter the territory 
perhaps classically traversed by Lukâcs in his pre-Marxist work Soul and 
Form.*0 But whereas Lukâcs called form »the highest judge of life«41 and 
agonized over the inability of life, with all its chaotic energy, to measure up to 
that stringent tribunal, the tradition we have been examining in this paper has 
had the opposite reaction. For the celebrants of the informe, it is precisely the 
failure of life to remain frozen in formal patterns, with its material impurities 
purged and its baser impulses expelled, that warrants praise.
From a psychoanalytic perspective more in tune with this inclination, it would 
be fruitful to consider Lacan’s celebrated analysis of the chiasmic intertwining 
of the eye and the gaze in The Four Fundamental Concepts o f 
Psycho-analysis.42 Here he provides a complicated explanation of the ways in 
which the subject is situated in a visual field split between an eye, which looks 
out on a geometrically ordered space before it, and a gaze, in which object 
»look back« at the body of the eye that is looking. Although modernist 
formalism sought to transcend the perspectivalist scopic regime identified with 
the eye in its most Cartesian version, it substituted a pure optically in which 
the tension between eye and gaze was suppressed.43 The modernist formalism 
celebrated by critics like Greenberg thus forgot what those critics sensitive to 
the inform e remembered: that the visual field was a contested terrain in which 
pure form was always disrupted by its other. That other might be interpreted 
in linguistic terms, as the interference of the symbolic with the imaginary, or 
as a conflict within the realm of vision itself, but however it be ultimately 
understood, it meant that modernism, indeed any art, could not be reduced to 
the triumph of pure form.
That Lacan’s own analysis emerged out of the same matrix as Bataille’s,44 that 
he was himself fascinated with the sublime, as Slavoj Žižek has recently
40 . George Lukâcs, Soul and Form, trans. Anna Bostock (Cambridge, Mass, 1971).
41 . Ibid., p. 172.
42. Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts o f Psychoanalysis, ed. Jacques Alain Miller, 
trans. Allan Sheridan (New York, 1981).
43. Philosophically, perhaps the most important defender of this position was Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty in such essays as »Cézanne’s Doubt,« Sense and Non-Sense, trans. Hubert L. 
Dreyfus and Patricia A. Dreyfus (Evanstion, 1964). Not surprisingly, he was frequently 
criticized by those like Lyotard hostile to the high modernist fetish of pure opticality.
44. For an exploration of Lacan’s debts to the Surrealist movement in the 1930's, see David 
Macey, Lacan in Contexts (London, 1988).
72 Martin Jay
reminded us,45 that he was deeply aware of the challenge to pure optically 
raised by the recovery of anamorphosis by critics like Jurgis Baltrušaitis,46 
means that his ideas were themselves indebted to the revaluation of 
formlessness that we are now trying to explain. One comentator, Joan Copjec, 
has in fact gone so far as to claim that »contrary to the idealist position that 
makes form  the cause of being, Lacan locates the cause of being in the 
informe; the unformed (that which has no signified, no significant shape in the 
visual field); the inquiry (the question posed to representation’s presumed 
reticence).«47 It may, therefore, be problematic to rely on him entirely for an 
explanation of the specific dialectic of form and formlessness in modernism. 
For his analysis of the eye and the gaze was aimed at uncovering the workings 
of vision in all contexts and for all time.
A more historically specific approach might usefully draw on Peter Bürger’s 
well-known distinction between modernism and the avant-garde.48 Whereas 
modernism remained within the institution of art, seeking to explore the limits 
of aesthetic self-referentiality, the avant-garde sought to reunite art with life, 
thus allowing the emancipatory energies of the former to revitalize the latter. 
The high modernist apotheosis of pure form, it might be argued, fits well into 
the first of these categories; the differentiation of the visible from the other 
senses, which we have noted as one of the central impulses behind formalism, 
corresponds to the differentiation of the institution of art from the lifeworld. 
The counter-impulse we have identified with the informe, on the other hand, 
is perhaps better understood as part of the avant-garde’s project, in Bürger’s 
sense of the term. That is, it calls into question the purity of the aesthetic 
realm, undermines the distinction between high art and base existence, and 
reunites vision with the other senses. Not surprisingly, Bataille and other 
defenders of informe would often argue for its political value as a way to 
realize the revolutionary potential of the unformed masses. Kristin Ross’s 
celebration of Rimbaud’s notion of class as a swarm is an instance of this 
impulse, which seeks to protect the proletariat from its form-giving 
representatives in the vanguard party.
All of these explanations help us make sense of the struggle between form and 
formlessness in aesthetic modernism, but the context in which I think it might 
most suggestively be placed is, as I have argued above, the crisis of 
ocularcentrism in Western culture. That is, with the dethroning of the eye as 
the noblest of the senses, with the revalorization of the »acephalic« body 
whose boundaries are permeable to the world, with the celebration of noise
45. Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object o f Ideology (London, 1989).
46. Jurgis Baltrušaitis, Anamorphoses ou magie artificielle des effects m erveilleux (Paris, 1969), 
on which Lacan draws in The Four Fundamental Concepts o f Psycho-analysis, p. 79f.
47. Joan Copjec, »The Orthopsychic Subject: Film Theory and the Reception of Lacan,« 
October, 49 (Summer, 1989), p. 69.
48. Biirger, Theory o f the Avant-Garde.
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and force over clarity and contour, the »will-to-form« that critics like Riegl 
saw as the ground of aesthetics has been supplanted or at least powerfully 
supplemented by a contrary »will-to-formlessness.«
From one perspective, all of these changes might be damned as complicitous 
with a dangerous counter-enlightenment irrationalism and libidinal politics. 
And in certain respects the charge may be valid, at least if the complicated 
dialectic of form and formlessness is forgotten and a simple-minded 
anti-formalism is put in its place. But from another point of view, there may 
be less cause for alarm. For may it perhaps be a mark of a kind of cultural 
maturity that we no longer tremble, tremble, as did Simmel or Lukâcs, at the 
»tragic« possibility that life and form cannot be harmoniously united? May we, 
in fact, conclude that the modernist stand-off between form and informe has 
left us with a willingness to tolerate a mixture of intelligibility and 
unintelligibility, boundaried integrity and transgressive force, spiritualized 
ocularity and the messiness of the rest of our bodies, that betokens a less 
anxious age? Have we learned to accept limits on the form-giving constitutive 
subject, abandoned the search for timeless essence amidst the plethora of 
ephemeral appearances, and realized that the distinction between ergon and 
parergon, text and context, is not as fixed as it appeared? If so, the 
performative power of saying the »universe is something like a spider or spit« 
may have actually done some of its work, and the hope of harnessing the 
emancipatory (but not redemptive) energies of modernist -  or in Bürger’s 
terms, avant-garde -  art for life may not be so vain after all.
.
